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NOTRE DAME
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SOME GERMAN DEFINITIONS OF LAW AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM KANT TO KELSEN
IN the evolution of a particularly problematic legal term
within a particular age and civilization, the legal philoso-
pher possesses an important clue to the legal mind of this
period. Neither the philosopher, nor the jurist, nor the
historian can ever hope for a complete understanding of a
foreign legal civilization which to a great extent belongs to
the past; partial understanding he can reasonably expect,
however, if he undertakes to sift out certain key terms in
order to determine their meaning in relation to other less
problematic terms.'
According to Kait the concept of law and right is some-
thing derived exclusively from pure reason. "The jurist
has to discover the true sources of all that can be called
1 This paper does not attempt to furnish a complete list of all the definitions
of law and legal philosophy which have been proposed by the very prolific Ger-
man writers on philosophy and jurisprudence during the nineteenth and early part
of the twentieth centuries. Those who are looking for a more exhaustive treat-
ment of this subject may consult the many brilliant writings of Dean Roscoe
Pound which in their thoroughness and .completeness are without parallel. The
present author merely proposes to cite some rather significant statements, and to
add the definitions of those authors who are primarily speculative philosophers
rather than practical jurists. It cannot be denied, however, that many of the
primarily philosophical definitions of law and legal philosophy -have had a great
influence on leading jurists. Thus, for instance, the revival of the so-called late
"historical school of jurisprudence" in Germany is due to the works of Dilthey
rather than to a renaissance of Savigny's ideas.
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law and right exclusively in pure reason. And in doing so
he lays the foundation of a possible positive legal order." 2
Law and right as such "are the sum total of those conditions
by which the free moral will of one person can be reconciled
with the free moral will of another person according to a
universal law of moral freedom." I The "strict law" is "the
possibility of a reciprocal and universal external coercion
which coincides with the free moral will of every person
according to universally valid laws."' The basic or natural
(innate) right of man is man's "freedom and independence
of the arbitrary will of another." I "Legal coercion is noth-
ing else than the enforced removal of an obstacle arbitrarily
restricting the free exercise of man's moral freedom." This
removal, however, must be "consistent with the freedom of
every other person according to a universal law of free-
dom." 6 All legal duties and, hence, all rights, are grounded
in practical reason.7  Law and morals or, as Kant puts it,
"legality" and "morality" have to be distinguished: "Every
command which declares a certain conduct to be a duty and
at the same time considers this duty the sole motive of our
conduct, is a moral command. That command, however,
which also admits other motives - such as external com-
pulsion - is a legal command." "The mere coincidence
... of external conduct and law - the mere external com-
pliance with the law - without taking into account the
inner motive, is called legality; the coincidence of conduct
and law in which the idea of normal duty ... constitutes the
compelling motive, is called morality." I All purely "legal
2 MetaPihysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre, p. 31 (in: vol. VII, edit.
Cassirer) (1797).
3 Ibid., p. 31. Compare also Reike, Lose Blitter aus Kants Nachass, vol. I,
part 18, p. 47.
4 Ibid., p. 33.
5 Ibid., p. 39.
6 Ibid., p. 32.
7 Ibid., p. 18 ff.; p. 21.
8 Ibid., p. 19.
9 Ibid., p. 19.
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duties are external duties." 1o "Law and morals have cer-
tain duties in common, but not the manner in which these
duties are compelling." 11 The moral command to consider
also the merely legal duties as moral duties turns all legal
duties into moral duties, or to be more exact, into "indirect-
ethical duties." 12
Under the influence of Kant is also Bouterwek who de-
clares that pure reason constitutes the source of all that is
law and right. 8  Likewise influenced by Kant is A. Feuer-
bach's statement that "natural law is the systematic science
of the rights of man given to us by pure reason and per-
ceived by us through pure reason." 14 Natural law itself "is
a problem of scientific philosophy," 5 divorced from morals
by its particular subject. Law and right constitute some-
thing given by and anchored in pure reason, 16 or to be more
specific, it originates with practico-juridical reason." Law
itself might, be defined as "the possibility and permissibility
of external compulsion by pure reason," as "the permissi-
bility of compulsion determined by pure reason for the sake
of the moral law." 11 Law is, in the final analysis, "the pos-
sibility and permissibility of enforcing a conduct through
which no other rational individual is being treated as an
arbitrary means to arbitrary ends."
10 Ibid., p. 19.
*1 Ibid., p. 20, p. 21. Kant means here that moral duties are subject to moral
self-compulsion (autonomous duties), while legal duties are subject to external
compulsion or coercion (heteronomous duties).
12 Ibid., p. 21. Under the immediate influence of Kant were the following
writers on jurisprudence. Mellin, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Rechte (1796);
Hufeland, Lehrs&tze des Naturrechts (1790); Hofbauer, Untersuchungen iber die
wichtigsten Gegenstinde des Naturrechts (1795); Bendavid, Versuca einer Rechts-
lehre (1802); Schmalz, Recht der Natur (1795); Krug, Dikdologie oder phi-
losophische Rechtstehre (1817); Mass, Grundlage des Naturrechts (1808); Hey-
denreich, Naturrecht (1795); Tieftrunk, Naturrecht (1797); Jacob, Naturrecht
(1795).
13 Lehrbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1806), vol. II, p. 193. Com-
pare also Abriss der philosophischen Rechtslehre (1798).
14 Kritik des natfirlichen Rechts, p. 31 (1796).
15 Ibid., p. 34.
16 Ibid., p. 241.
17 Ibid., p. 244.
18 Ibid., p. 259.
19 Ibid., p. 295.
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J. G. Fichte, who draws a sharp distinction between the
moral and the legal order, nevertheless subordinates the
latter under the former. The concept of law and right is
basically rooted in the very essence of reason.20 The funda-
mental and inalienable rights of every individual are his ra-
tional and moral claims to freedom. These rights, however,
become truly operative and effective only within the frame-
work of an enforced legal order established by society. A
jural relation is a relation of mutual restraint, a definition
which logically flows from the concept of a morally free in-
dividual. The nature of this relation "can be deduced from
the pure form or reason of the moral and rational 'self' as
such," 21 without taking special recourse to any particular
moral consideration. 2 Hence the law has nothing to do
with man's moral will; it merely entitles man to exercise his
rights, but does not compel him to do so.23 Law and right
are the prerequisite of a community of free human beings.24
Pure reason demands absolute freedom, while the idea of a
community of free human beings requires restriction of this
same freedom.25 Law is possible only within a community
of individuals, and only in form of positive enactments. 26
All true law and right are natural law, and hence rational
law.27  This is the fundamental principle of law and right:
"I must in all cases recognize the free being outside of me
as such, that is to say, I must limit my freedom to the possi-
bility of his freedom." 28 The end of law is "the founda-
tion of law and, hence, the criterion of law and right." 2
The just legal order, which serves the preservation of law
and right, rests upon the common consensus of all individual
20 Gesammelte Werke (edit. Medicus), vol. III, p. 8 ff.
21 Ibid., vol. III, p. 53.
22 Ibid., vol. III, p. 55.
28 Ibid., vol. III, p. 54.
24 Ibid., vol. III, p. 89.
25 Ibid., vol. III, p. 92 if.
26 Ibid., vol. III, p. 148.
27 Naokgelassene Werke, vol. H, p. 493 if.
28 Gesammelie Werke, vol. III, p. 52.
29 Nachgelassene Werke, vol. II, p. 529.
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free will. Schelling observes that "the first rise of law and
right is not the result of blind chance, but one of a natural
necessity which... compelled man, without his being fully
aware of it, to establish a stable legal order." " Eschen-
mayer, who is strongly under the influence of Fichte, defines
law as that "principle of reason which has been transferred
from the domain of reason into the province of the will." "
Hegel conceived law as the objective form, as well as the
product of the dialectical evolution and unfolding, of the
Idea of right and just. It is, in the final analysis, the pro-
duct of the "universal spirit" (Gesamtgeist). A truly phil-
osophical science of law has the "Idea of law and right" for
its foremost object.2 Law is an attempt to "comprehend
the State and the legal order as being something eminently
rational." "I Law signifies "the existence of being in general
-- the existence of a free will." It is "freedom conceived
as an Idea," " the "existential reality of freedom in the ex-
ternal world." 85 Law is founded on the Idea of the morally
free and individual human personality. "The law of nature
... is the rational acknowledgment of external compulsion
and the application or realization of this compulsion." 86
Law, according to its Idea, on the other hand, signifies the
unfolding and realization of the Idea of freedom within so-
ciety. Crime is the negation of law and right through an act
of an arbitrarily violent and evil will; punishment the nega-
tion of this negation or the sanction and reprisal for a crime
and, hence, the "right of the criminal." "7 According to
Lasson, law and legal philosophy are "the science of what is
right and just, since that which is right and just is imminent
30 System des transzendentalen Idealismus, p. 408 (1800).
31 Psychologe, p. 384 (1817).
82 Grundlhnien der Philosophie des Reckts, par. 1 (1821).
38 Ibid., foreword, p. 18.
34 Ibid., p. 63.
35 Enzykopddie der philosophischen Wissenchaften, par. 496 (1817).
86 Ibid., p. 5o2.
ST Ibid. p. 499.
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to law." " Legal philosophy properly so-called is part and
parcel of ethics. Its foremost task is to comprehend "the
existing laws in terms of their inner or rational correla-
tion." " The fundamental principles of law and justice are
the following: "1. The first and most basic principle of law
and right provides that every person should hold every good
which he has acquired without being hindered by the acts
of any other person; 2. That for every value transferred,
one should receive in return an equal value; 3. Every pro-
duced value belongs to the producer; 4. Every destroyed
good is to be destroyed to the destroyer, and if the destroyed
good belongs to another person, the destroyer should suffer
a substraction from his own good until the injured person
is compensated for his injury by an equivalent value." 4
"The rule backed by force first awakens us to the actuality
of law. A rule which does not possess the guarantee found
in compulsion cannot be called law." 41
To Krause legal philosophy is "the understanding of law
and state on the basis of pure reason, as eternal truths." 42
Law and right signify "the whole of the conditions of ra-
tional determination which are to be realized through free-
dom." 11 Law in its higher meaning is "a state of harmony
and soundness of all things in their relationship to one an-
other and to God." 4 It is "the universal and essential form
of the various relationships of all beings to all beings, ac-
cording to which within a community of all beings each in-
dividual being in its own nature as well as the harmony of
each individual being to all other beings becomes real and
38 System der Rechtspilosophie, p. 259 (1882). Similar ideas are to be found
in E. v. Hartmann, Die Phdnomenologie des sittlichen Beunssstseins, p. 407 (1879).
89 Lasson, op. cit., p. 1.
40 Ibid., par. 24.
41 Ibid., p. 207. Other "early Hegelians" were: Michelet (Naturrecht, 1866);
Zoepfel (Vorlesungen fiber Rechtsphilosophie, 1879); Rosenkranz (System der
Wissenschaft, 1866-1868, particularly par. 724 ff., 761 ff., 780 ff.); Besser (System
des Naturrechts, 1830).
42 Abriss des Systems der Rechtsphilosophie, p. 1 (1828).
43 Ibid., p. 7.
44 Urbild der Menschheit, 3rd edit., p. 56 (1811).
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effective." " The Idea of law and right is a divine or cosmic
Idea (gittliche Weltidee)." Law and right express the or-
ganic unity and oneness not only of the single life of God
which is determined by freedom, but also of the life of all
rational human individuals.47 It is, in other words, "the
organic whole of the external conditions of life measured by
reason." 4  Similar ideas are found in Roeder 49 and Ahrens
who insists that law is "a principle .. .governing the ex-
ercise of liberty in the various relations of human exis-
tence." '0 "Legal philosophy or natural law is that type of
science which deduces from the essence and ordination of
man as well as that of human society the highest principle
or Idea of law and right in order to develop a system of legal
norms for the various provinces of private and public law." 51
"The universal concept of law and right cannot be deduced
from experience. Law manifests itself in the conscious rea-
soning of man as a standard with the help of which we are
capable of evaluating existing conditions and through which
we are able to call for improvement." ' 5 The law is "a
norm or standard which regulates the use of freedom by
harmonizing this freedom with the general conditions of life
and the general interests in goods."" It is "a rule or
standard governing as a whole the conditions necessary for
the attainment of whatever is good; it assures the well-being
both of the individual and of society . . . " " Law, which
must also be regarded as being a "supplement to morals," "
is "the organic whole of those conditions which are deter-
mined by the activity of the will; these conditions are meant
45 Ibid., p. 56.
46 Ibid., p. 56.
47 Abrss des Systems der Rechtsphilosophie, p. 170 (1828)
48 Ibid., p. 209.
49 Grundzilge des natirlichen Rechts, p. 3 (1846).
50 Cours du droit nat-urel, 8th edit., vol. I, p. 107 (1st edit. 1836).
51 Naturrecht, vol. I, p. 1 (1870-1871)
52 Ibid., vol. I, p. 226.
53 Ibid., vol. I, p. 228.
54 PMiosophische Einleitung, in: Holtzendorff, Enzyklopddie der Rechtswis-
senschaft, 1st edit. (1870).
55 Naturrecht, p. 264.
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to realize the total ordinations of human existence and the
essential ends inherent in human existence." " It has for
its basic end "the regulation and order.., of all the recip-
rocal relations that exist among all the phases of life ... for
the purpose of realizing all rational ends." " The ultimate
and highest purpose of the law is "the perfection of human
personality and human solidarity." 18 According to Stahl
legal philosophy is "the science of what is objectively right
and just." " It "correlates law and state to the ultimate
cause and final end of all existence." 60 Law is "the vital
order of every people or community of peoples for the pur-
pose of preserving God's universal order." 61 It is a "human
or secular order, ordained by God's own command, and
based upon divine authority, intended to serve the divine
order." 62
The so-called historical school of jurisprudence em-
phasized the historico-organic growth of law. Law and
right, then, are but the organic evolution and product of
the legal genius of a particular people. Thus Puchta insists
that all law is originally historically developed and deter-
mined custom. "In virtue of his freedom man is the sub-
ject of law and right. His freedom is the foundation of law
and right, and all real jural relations emanate from this free-
dom. . . In thus founding law and right upon the possibility
of an act of the will, the essential principle of law and right
is indicated as one of equality. Law and right imply the
recognition of freedom as belonging equally to all men in so
far as they are subject to the power of will. Law and right
56 Ibid., p. 264.
57 Ibid., p. 278.
58 Ibid., p. 278. Similar ideas are to be found in Herbart (Anodytische Be-
lkuchtung des Naturrechts und der Moral, 1836); Plank (Katechismus des Rechts,
1852).
59 Philosophie des Rechts, 3d edit., vol. I, p. 1 (1830-1837).
60 Ibid., vol II, p. 3.
61 Ibid., vol. I, p. 194.
62 Ibid., vol. I, p. 194. Similar ideas are to be found in Chalibaeus (System
der spekulativen Ethik, 1850); Lauer (Philosophie des Rechts, 1846); Walter
(Naturrecht und Politik, 1862).
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receive their materials and their contents from the [his-
torically determined] impulse of man to refer to himself
what exists outside of himself. The function of law and
right, as manifested in the legal order, is to apply the prin-
ciple of equality to the relations which arise from the opera-
tions of this impulse." 8 3 Law, hence, is "the recognition of
the just freedom which manifests itself in the personal ex-
ertions of the will, and in man's influence upon objects." 64
Savigny holds that law is "an organic phenomenon of a given
people." 85 "Man stands in the midst of the external world,
and the most important element in his environment is his
contact with those who are like him in their nature and des-
tiny. If free beings are to co-exist in such a relation of con-
tact, furthering rather than hindering each other in their
development, invisible boundaries must be recognized with-
in which the existence and activity of each individual gains
a secure free opportunity. The rules whereby such bound-
aries are determined and through which this free opportunity
is being secured, is the law." 88 Windscheid informs us that
"the legal order, on the basis of a concrete situation of fact,
puts forth a command, requiring conduct of a .certain sort,
and puts this command at the free disposition of the one for
whose benefit it was issued. It leaves it to him whether or
not he will make use of the command and in particular
whether or not he will put into action the means afforded
by the legal order against those who disobey it. His will
is determining for the carrying out of the commands issued
by the legal order. The legal order has made its commands
his commands. What is law and right has become his right
... A right, then, is a power or authority of the will con-
ferred by the legal order." 67
63 Cursus der Institutionen, vol. I, par 4 (1841).
64 Ibid., vol. I, par. 6.
85 System des heutigen rtdmischen Rechts, vol. I, p. 14 (1840).
6 Ibid., vol. I, par. 6.
67 Lehrbuch des Pandektenreohts vol. I, par. 37.
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Arendts defines law and right as "an aggregate of rules
which determine the essential relations of man living in a
community." 68 "Law and right exist for the sake of liberty.
Law has its basis in this, that men are beings endowed with
a disposition to free exercise of their will. It exists to pro-
tect liberty in that it limits caprice and arbitrariness." "
"Legal philosophy has for its subject the law, that is, an
aggregate of standards which determine the reciprocal re-
lationships of men living in a society." 7o According to Dahn
the, idea of law and right exists only within the various terri-
torial and rational legal order of each individual people or
nation.7 Legal philosophy "is the science of the idea of
law and right within the framework of history." 7 Hence
its method is the historical method.73  Law and right are not
subservient to the moral ideal; " they emerge from the urge
of the human spirit to discover universals, as well as from
the necessity to unearth the principle of reason inherent in
every particular.71 "Law and right constitute . . . the ra-
tional order of peace (Friedermsordnung) within a [histori-
cally given] community of men, an order, that is, which con-
cerns itself with men's relations to one another as well as to
goods." " Sohm, on the other hand, calls law "the sum total
of moral rules which grant to persons living in a society a
certain power over the external world." 17 And Merkel de-
fines it as "the rule of conduct to which a society gives effect
68 Jurstische Enzykloiidie, par. 1 (1850).
69 Ibid., p. 12.
70 Ibid., p. 12.
71 Rechtsphilosophische Studien, p. 5 (1883). Compare also Datn, Die
Vernunft im Recht (1879).
72 Rechtsphlgosophische Studien, p. 5.
73 Ibid., p. 12.
74 Ibid., p. 20.
75 Ibid., p. 35.
76 Ibid., p. 36. Similar ideas are to be found in Gierke, Deutsches Genossen-
schajtsrecht, vol. I, p. 125 ff. (1895).
77 Institutionen des rdmischen Rechts, par. 7 (1889).
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in respect to the behavior of its subjects towards others and
towards itself, as well as in respect to the forms of its ac-
tivities." 18
According to Schopenhauer "injustice" is primary to
"justice." Injustice is "the invasion of the boundaries of
the affirmative will of another." 7" Thus law signifies "the
negation of injustice or lawlessness." 80 The "pure theory
of law" is just "a chapter of general ethics." 81 Law and
the legal order are the product of convention; they are meant
to repel acts of injustice.82 The purpose of law is "intimida-
tion in order to prevent wrongful acts." 88 Law and justice,
in the final analysis, "arise from a sensation of compas-
sion." 84 The concepts of "injustice" (legal wrong) and
justice as well as those of "injury" and non-injury - and
repulsion of an injury is tantamount to non-injury 85  are
independent of all empirical enactment and, hence, logically
precede the positive law.88 From this it follows that there
"is such a thing as an ethical theory of law or natural law,
and that any pure theory of law is completely independent
of all empirical or positive enactments." 87 The basic con-
cepts of law and non-law (Recht und Unrecht) are the pro-
ducts of a synthesis of the empirical concept of injury and
the rational principle that I may repel every form of aibi-
trary interference by another without committing myself an
act of injustice. 8 "Legal philosophy is that part of general
ethics which determines those acts which I cannot commit
78 In: Holtzendorff, Enzyklop~die der Rechtswissenschaft, Sth edit., p. 5
(1890).
79 Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, bk. IV, par. 62 (1819) (vol. I, p. 383
if., edit. Frischeisen-Kbhler).
80 Ibid., p. 384;
81 Ibid., p. 386.
82 Ibid., p. 386 ff.
83 Ibid., p. 392.
84 tiber das Fundament der Moral (1841) par. 17 (vol. III, p. 359 ff. edit.
Frischeisen-K~hler).
85 Ibid., vol. III, p. 363.
86 Ibid., vol. III, p. 364
87 Ibid., vol. IT, p. 364.
88 Ibid., vol. III, p. 364.
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unless I injure another and thus commit an act of injus-
tice." 19 A legal duty constitutes "an act, the mere omission
of which injures another." Herbart deduces the concept of
law and right from the practical idea which approves of
volitional relationships. The Idea of law and right is
founded upon "the disapproval of strife and conflict." 91
"Law and right signify the agreement of several wills which,
in form of a rule, is meant to prevent strife and conflict." 92
According to Trendelenburg law and right is "the sum
total of those universal determinations of action through
which.., the ethical whole as well as its parts may not only
be preserved but further developed." 13 Legal philosophy
has always to distinguish between that which is conditional-
ly just and that which "is absolutely and objectively (moral-
ly) just and thus is above all conditions." 11 Legal coercion
or sanction "is the physical aspect of law and right." 9 It
has always a moral end. 9" The legal order signifies "the
fullest unfolding and realization of the whole of mankind
in the individual form of peoples or nations." 9 I. H. Fichte,
who is not to be confounded with J. G. Fichte, his father,
defines the Idea of law and right as the "manifestation of
the fundamental will of man (menscklicher Grundwille).
"Every person within society has an equal claim to the com-
plete unfolding and development of his innermost indivi-
duality." 11 Law and right are a priori concepts and, at the
same time, something which unfolds itself in the course of
history.99 Harms tells us that legal philosophy is "the
89 Ibid., vol. I, p. 364.
90 Ibid., vol. III, p. 366.
91 Gesammelte Werke (edit. Hartenstein), vol. II' p. 366 ff.
92 Ibid., vol. II, p. 367. Compare also vol. IV, p. 120. Similar ideas were
expressed by Thilo, Die theologische Rechts-und Staatslehre (1861).
98 Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik, p. 76 (1860).
94 Ibid., p. 83.
95 Ibid., p. 90 ff.
96 Ibid., p. 103 ff.
97 Ibid., p. 284.
98 System der Etlzik, vol. I, p. 18 ff., vol. II p. 475 ((1850-1853).
99 Ibid., vol. I, p. 19.
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science of the conditions and principles underlying an
empirical understanding of law and right" (empirische
Rechtserkenntnis).100 According to the Catholic philosopher
Cathrein "anything that corresponds to its norm or is as it
ought to be," is lawful. 101 The end of law is "the free and
independent existence of man as the subject of rights," 102
as well as the secure existence of society." 3 All law, at least
indirectly, is derived from the divine will,' °4 and as such
signifies a vital part of the universal moral order.105 The
natural law constitutes the criterion, foundation, and limita-
tion of all positive law. 06 Hertling insists that there is an
absolute and absolutely compelling objective moral law
which demands that man consciously realizes the divine plan
of God. "Man has to fill that position which has been given
to him within the divine plan." 107 "Good is whatever is in
accord with the divine purposefulness; . . . evil whatever
runs contrary to it." 108 Law and right can only be under-
stood in the light of this purposefulness. All attempts to
separate law from the moral order and to give to it an in-
dependent status are doomed to complete failure. The posi-
tive law has to be in accord with the moral law. The legal
order is not an "emergency measure, the lesser evil." It is
something "good and valuable." 10I But the positive law in
itself is not the highest manifestation of the moral Idea,
100 Begriff, Formen und Grundlegung der Rechtsplilosophie, p. 21 (1889).
101 Moralphilosophie, vol. I, p. 2 (1911).
102 Ibid., vol. I, p. 424.
103 Ibid., vol. I, p. 425.
104 Ibid., vol. I, p. 333.
105 Ibid., vol. I, p. 425.
106 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 477 ff. Compare also Cathrein, Naturrecht und positives
Recht (1901); Hertling, Naturrecht und Soziaipolitik (1893); Mausbach, Christ-
lich-Kathoische Ethik (1906); Mausbach, Philosophia Moralis (12th edit., 1921);
Scherer, Religion und Ethos (1908); Scherer, Sittlichkeit und Recht (1904); Hert-
ling, Recht, Staat und Gesellschaft (1906); Koch, Das menschliche Leben und
die natirlichen Grundziige der Sittlichkeit (2d and 3d edit., 1916); Schneider, Die
gdttliche Weltordnung und religionslose Sittlichkeit (1900); Fessler, Die Phi-
losophie des Rechts (1907); Schilling, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts (1859-1863);
Hillebrand, Recht und Sitte (1896).
107 Recht, Stoat und Gesellschaft, p. 30 (1906).
108 Ibid., p. 30 ff.
109 Ibid., p. 71.
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because there is also the moral conscience of every individual
which in case of a conflict is of a decisive nature."' B. Stern
declares that the essence of law and right is eternally im-
mutable. For the Idea of law and right is in itself a uni-
versal human idea."' The kernel of all law and right must
be discovered in ethics." 2  The truly rational law (Ver-
numftrecht) is "the Idea of justice which seeks realization
in the empirical world." I"
The positivists such as Bierling define law as "all that
which persons living under some form of association even-
tually recognize as the norm and rule of their communal
life." 114 The purpose of all law is "a determinate external
behavior of man towards man. The means of attaining this
purpose, wherein alone the law consists, are norms and im-
peratives." "', Bergbohm, the great antagonist of natural
law,".6 insists 'that legal philosophy cannot create law. For
reason merely assists in the deduction of legal principles.
Since there are no such things as absolute and objective prin-
ciples of law and right, we are forced to operate with cer-
tain legal ideals rather than legal Ideas." 7 Gareis defines
law as "a peaceable ordering (Friedirmsordnung) of the ex-
ternal relations of men ... to one another. It is a form of
ordering or regulating of human relations through the enact-
ment or issuance of commands and prohibitions." 1" Juris-
prudence or legal philosophy is "legal encyclopedia," that is,
"a systematic and unified survey of the peaceable adjust-
ment of the external relations of mankind and that of social
communities." "' According to Merkel law signifies "a
110 Ibid., p. 73.
II Positive Begriindung des philosophischen Strafrechts, p. 15 ff. (1905).
112 Ibid., p. 18 ff.
113 Ibid., p. 63. Similar ideas are to 'be found in J. Stem, Recht und Rechts-
wissenschaft (1904) ; Lauterburg, Recht und Sittlichkeit.
114 Bierling, Juristische Prinzipienlehre, vol. I, p. 18 (1894-1898)
115 Ibid., vol. I, p. 18.
116 Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphllosophie, vol. I, p. 435 ff., p. 523 ff. (1902).
117 Ibid., vol. I, p. 420.
118 Enzyklopidie der Rechtswissenschaft (Holtzendorff, 1887), par. 5.
119 Ibid., par. 5.
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general directive which society carries out not only as re-
gards the conduct of its members towards one another as
well as towards this society itself, but also as regards the
forces or forms by which the society as such functions." 120
Baumann, again, calls law and right "the sum total of those
interests and claims which are indispensable in human inter-
course based upon the principle of freedom." 121 Dernburg
defines law and right as "the ordering of the relations of life
which is guaranteed by the general will." 122 Somlo, on the
other hand, sees in law merely the norms enacted by a com-
prehensive and permanent supreme power [state] which by
mere tradition enjoys supreme authority.'3 "All those as-
sertions about law and right, which for the time being ignore
the specific content of law and right, are the fundamental
principles (Grundlehren) of the science of law." 124 The
concepts developed in these fundamental principles are called
"jural principles (juristische Grundbegriffe); and the sys-
tem of these fundamental pinciples is defined as funda-
mental jural doctrines (juristische Gvundlekren)." 125 Law
signifies "the sum total of norms enacted by a universal,
constant and supreme power which, as a rule, enjoys obedi-
ence." 128 The concept of law and right is an empirical con-
cept; it is the "relative a priori of legal science." 127 Law
denotes the ordering of the social actuality. 28
Knapp defines legal philosophy as the task "to expose and
remove all legal phantasms." 120 It is "the high police of
all legal science, watching over the hiding places of the pro-
120 .Elemente der allgemeinen Rechtslehre, par. 1.
121 Handbuch der Moral, p. 374. Compare also E. v. Hartmenn, Die Ph-
nomenologie des sittlichen Bewussteins, p. 499 ff. (1879).
122 Das bfirgerkche Recht des deutschen Reichs und Preussens, vol. I, par. 3
(1903).
123 Jurtische Grundlehre, p. 105 (1907).
124 Ibid., p. 8.
125 Ibid., p. 8.
126 Ibid., p. 127.
127 Ibid., p. 127.
128 Ibid., p. 55.
129 System der Rechtsphlosophie, p. 215, p. 241 ff.; see also foreword (1857).
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fessional and habitual enemies of exact science." 130 Law
denotes "the enforced subjection of the individual to what-
ever is conceived as being in the common interest of every-
one." 131 It is, historically speaking, a "struggle over the
decisive and deciding objective power;""'3 an "appeal to
an ultimate objective power which enforces and executes the
various legal enactments." '18 Every established legal order
or body of positive laws has a definite purpose or end. And
in each instance' this end "is the father of the law." 134 The
paramount end of law is the forcible securing of those in-
terests which by implication constitute the real content of
the law.' 85 With Jellinek the legal order signifies "the sum
total of all those conditions or prerequisites that are neces-
sary to sustain social existence." Law and right denote a
"moral minimum." 136 The legal order is primarily a teleo-
logical unity, a system of purposes. 3 ' Sternberg calls legal
philosophy in the wider sense of the term "our complete
knowledge of law. But this knowledge is, on the one hand,
practical experience, and on the other hand, philosophical
understanding. Accordingly it may be divided into the
science of law . . . also called jurisprudence, and the phi-
losophy of law." 138 Richard Schmidt also insists that "the
theory of law may set itself narrower or wider limits for its
task. Accordingly it is either jurisprudence (science of law)
... ; or philosophy of law. In its narrower sense jurispru-
dence has to do primarily with the immediate application of
the law, the carrying out of existing laws, juristic technique
... It inquires only with respect to the law as to which we
can say that it obtains; that it is in force; that is: that it
is generally recognized as furnishing a measure or standard
130 Ibid., p. 205, p. 9, p. 10.
131 Ibid., p. 197.
132 Ibid., p. 217.
133 Ibid., p. 218.
134 Ibid., p. 219.
135 Ibid., p. 207.
136 Die soziaethische Bedeutung des Rechts, p. 42.
187 Aligemeine Staatslehre, p. 195 if., p. 302 ff.
138 Allgemeine Staatstehre, vol. I, par. 12.
FROM KANT TO KELSEN
for the events of life, for legal transactions, for wrongs, for
tax administration, for acts of police, for affairs of interna-
tional intercourse and the like. In the modern state this is
mainly the written law." "I
Jhering defines law as "the sum total of constraining rules
which obtain in a politically organized society," 140 in other
words, "the system of purposes and interests secured by
compulsory means." 141 Law and right as well as the legal
order are the product of politically organized society.142
Law is "a disciplined force." 143 The basic idea of the legal
order is "the securing of the common or social interests of
all ... against certain particular or selfish interests which
threaten these social interests." 144 The legal order is "the
systematic organization of social compulsion." 14 The ulti-
mate end of "the legal order as well as of law is the establish-
ment and security of the basic conditions and prerequisites
of social existence." 146 Ofner likewise insists on the social
purposiveness of the law, for the purpose is the true essence
of the law. The end of law is "to be subservient to the well-
being of society as well as that of each of its many mem-
bers." 147 True law is social law; and social law "takes into
account the vital as well as economic conditions and prere-
quisites of the life of a people no less than the means of how
to improve these conditions." 148 It is social law "because
139 inflihrung in das Recht, 2d edit., par 4.
140 Der Zweck im Recht, Vol. I, p. 320 (1877).
141 Ibid., vol I, p. 240.
142 Ibid., vol I, p. 241.
143 Ibid., vol. I, p. 252.
144 Ibid., vol. I, p. 292
145 Ibid., vol. I, p. 320.
146 Ibid., vol. I, p. 417. The Grundmotiv of Jihering's whole philosophy of
law is the programmatic statement that "the purpose is the creator of all law."
Similar ideas are to be found in Lilienfeld, Gedanken iiber die Sozialwissenschaften
der Zukunft (1871-1883); Schiffle, Bau und Leben des soziolen Kdrper (1875-
1878); Gumplowicz, Grundriss der Soziologie (1885); Gumplowicz, Allgemeines
Staatsrecht (1897); Jerusalem, Soziologie des Rechts (1925); Wiese, Zur Grund-
legung der Gesellschaft (1906); Scherrer, Soziologie und Entwcklungsgeschichte der
Menschheit (1905-1908).
147 Soziales Reckt, p. 6.
148 Ibid., p. 6
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peoples themselves are no longer the object of the law...
but the source of the law." 149 It is social law "because it
rejects any conceptual jurisprudence which merely interprets
literally the existing laws; and because it opposes a purely
formalistic jurisprudence which only takes into account the
legal consequences attached to certain legal principles and
concepts." 150
Kirchmann, who became famous by his well-known dictum
that "three corrective words by the legislator turn whole
legal libraries into waste paper," defines law and right as "a
systematic balance between sensuous appetite and moral
restraint." ' The fundamental law is "force secured and
justified by a moral element which is inherent in this
force." 152 Law has its origin not in the state, 5 ' but in the
commands of authorities.'54 And those commands are the
law.'55 Law does not always require external compulsion,
for it can rest upon mere unchallenged authority.'56 Ac-
cording to Diihring law and the legal order are systematic
and orderly means of compulsion directed against arbitrary
force.'57 Criminal law is nothing else than "organized re-
taliation." 5  Gumplowicz calls law the product of power,"'
while Anton Menger insists that, in the final analysis, "every
legal order so far has arisen from certain factors inherent in
the general struggle for power." 160 Hence law and the legal
order are nothing else than "the systematized sum total of
those powers which are being acknowledged within a certain
nation." 161
149 Ibid., p. 6
150 Ibid., p. 6
151 Grundbegriffe des Rechts und der Moral, p. 114 (1869).
152 Ibid., p. 108.
153 Ibid., p. 146.
154 Ibid., p. 109.
15.5 Ibid., .p. 149 ff.
156 Ibid., p. 110.
157 Wirklichkeitsphilosophie, p. 407 (1895)
158 Ibid., p. 130.
159 Die soziologische Staatsidee, p. 7 (1892)
160 Neue Staatslehre, p. 3, p. 21 ff. (1905)
161 Ibid., p. 210.
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Ueberweg tells us that "the sphere of free self-determina-
tion and free self-assertion which belongs to every individual
. .. is the right of each person ...The total sum of these
self-determinations is the law." 1" Riimelin calls law "a
vital order of society (soziale Lebensordnung) in and
through which the idea of the good achieves actual force in
order to... secure a firm foundation for the complete realiza-
tion of all vital ends and interests of man.'" 63  Law has its
source and origin in the "human desire for order" (Ordnung-
styieb). 6  Heck, who together with Rilmelin is the founder
of the "jurisprudence of interests" (Interesseijurispru-
denz), 65 insists that true and just law has always to take
into account the general conditions of life as well as the na-
ture of those interests which are conflicting in the various
jural relations among individuals.'66 Law is an instrument
to secure social peace (soziale F'iedenssaftzung). It serves
the maintenance and promotion of certain social conditions
onducive to a fuller social life. And in doing so law pre-
serves peace among the various individuals claiming certain
interests.'67 Legal philosophy is not concerned with a logical
or abstract deduction of norms or principles. It proceeds
from the notion that law is a purposive creation of rational
man, and that, in the final analysis, all existing legal norms
owe their origin to the concept, pursuit, balance, and realiza-
tion of interests.' Legal philosophy is based upon the
general observation that within an existing society there are
certain interests which either supplement, or conflict with,
one another, for total life is bound to bring about a clash
of interests or claims. Hence it is the foremost task of law
and the legal order to define, delimit, and regulate these in-
162 Welt-und Lebensanschauung, p. 434.
168 Reden und Aufs.tzq, vol. I, p. 76.
164 Ibid., vol I, p. 80, vol. II, p. 349.
165 This school is definitely under the influence of Jhering.
166 Heck, Gesetzesauslegung und Interessensjurisprudenz, p. 310.
167 Ibid., p. 308.
168 DAs Problem der Rechtsgewinnung, p. 30 (1912). Compare also Rfimelin,
Schadensersatz ohne Verschulden, p. 60 (1910).
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terests. Law creates the individual norms in order to evalu-
ate individual interests. Thus it might be said that every
legal norm properly so-called actually signifies a value judg-
ment about an actual interest. 69
Kohler calls the legal order "an enforced adjustment of
the various relations of human life which arise from the so-
cial nature of man." '" Legal philosophy demonstrates
"how in each stage of evolving mankind certain legal in-
stitutions manifest those evolutionary ideas which are in-
herent in the various peoples." '' "Legal philosophy is a
branch of general philosophy, or to be more exact, of that
type of philosophy which deals with man and human civiliza-
tion." 172 Law, among other things, has its proper place in
the cultural evolution and history of mankind, for culture
and civilization are possible only if mankind accepts order.
"The legal order signifies the order of all vital relations.
This order is imposed on the whole of mankind in the in-
terest of securing and promoting cultural values.""' The
law must always be in conformity with the ever changing
cultural reality. Hence there is no such thing-as an eternally
immutable absolute law.' 4 All legal philosophy which fails
to take into account legal history is completely worthless. 5
Law and the legal order, being part of an ever evolving hu-
man civilization, are perennially in flux.' The end of law
is the fullest unfolding of human civilization in that it helps
to bring about the universal purpose of mankind. 7 Individ-
ual rights denote certain concrete relations sanctioned by
the legal order.' Baumgarten defines law as "a highly
169 Gesetzesauslegung und Interessensjurisprudenz, p. 310.
170 Einfflhrung in die Rechtswissenschajt, p. 1 (1902).
171 Enzyklopidie der Rechtswissenschaft (Holtzendorff), par. 8; see also p.
610 ff.; Arcldi flir Rechts-und Wirtschaftsphilosopsie vol. I (1907).
172 Lehrbuch der Recltsphilosophie (3 edit., 1923), p. 1.
179 Ibid., p. 9.
174 Ibid., p. 10.
175 Ibid., p. 10.
176 Einfiihrung in die Reohtswissenschaft, p. 2.
177 Ibid., p. 3.
178 Ibid., p. 10.
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developed, positive and valid vital order (Lebensordnung)
which, upon closer scrutiny, reveals itself as a harmonious
and integrated unity. This vital order consists of morally
significant commands, sanctions which are attached to these
commands, and authorizations." '" According to Berolz-
heimer legal philosophy is "a general theory of law" which
investigates the formal or constructive aspect of fundamental
juristic conceptions and legal institutions." ' Legal phi-
losophy in the narrow sense of the term is "a rational critique
of the positive law." 181 It has for its foremost task to un-
cover the ideal element in the law.'82 The final purpose of
law is the bringing about of peace and order.183
Tnnies instances that "everything which is in accord
with the very significance of a social relation, that is to say,
which has a meaning in and for this relation, is the law of
this social relation." 184 Natural law is "an order of human
co-existence which assigns to each volitional act its proper
domain of function. Thus natural law is actually the sum
total of all legal duties and rights." 18 Law is the product
of reason, the result of man's living in a society. 88 Accord-
ing to Dilthey law signifies "a system of ends (Zweckzusam-
menkang) based upon a definite realization of what is right
and just (Recktsbewusstsein). This Rechtsbewusstsein is
a constantly functioning psychological factor," 8' a voli-
tional fact or state of the will (Willensbestand).'88 Law and
social order are two correlative terms." 9 Law has for its
supposition the total will (Gesamtwille), that is to say, the
179 Die Wissenschaft vom Recht und ihre Methode, vol. I, p. 162 (1920).
180 System der Rechts-und Wirtschaftphilosophie, vol. II, p. 20 (1906).
181 Ibid., vol. II, p. 1.
182 Ibid., vol. II, p. 17.
188 Ibid., vol. II, p. 113.
184 Gemeinschaft sund Gesellschaft, p. 23 (1887).
185 Ibid, p. 23.
186 Ibid., p. 236.
187 Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, vol. I, p. 68 (1883). Compare
also ibid., p. 97.
188 Ibid., vol. I, p. 69.
189 Ibid., vol. I, p. 69.
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common will of the total commmunity."9 ° It is "a function
of the external organization of society." 191 It "apportions
the spheres of the power of action of each individual in rela-
tion to the task which, in accordance with his position, this
individual has within an externally organized society." 1
92
Law is not consciously made, but merely discovered.' 93
Lipps defines law as "a will or command expressed or ex-
pressible in form of general statements." "' This will "not
only demands practical recognition by a group of individuals,
but also, if the need arises, possesses the means and power
to enforce this practical recognition." 195 Schuppe calls law
and right that "specific intent which forbids one person to
injure another. This specific intent emanates from a basic
axiological consideration which in turn creates a general and
logically necessary intent or will to affirm the right of self-
assertion." 196
According to Wundt law and right are not the product of
arbitrary convention, but "the natural result of that type
of conscious activity which has its ever flowing source in
those experiences and aspirations which have been stimu-
lated by the fact that men live in groups. Originally law,
custom, and morals were one and the same; and law was
intimately related to religious views and convictions." ' In
the course of history law becomes differentiated both from
original custom and morals. 9 ' Law is "the sum total of
those norms... which politically organized society not only
enforces among those.., who are ruled by one and the same
political authority or state, but which the same state also
observes in its relations to its subjects as well as to other
190 Ibid., vol. I, P. 69.
191 Ibid., vol. I, p. 97.
192 Ibid., vol. I, p. 97.
193 Ibid., vol. I, p. 97. This statement alone would assign to Dilthey a
prominent place in the so-called "historical school" of jurisprudence.
194 Die ethischen Grundfragen, p. 227 (1899).
195 Ibid., p. 227.
196 Grundzfige der Ethik und der Rechtsphilosophie, p. 293 (1882).
197 Logik, vol. U1, p. 2 (1880).
198 Ibid., vol. II, p. 2.
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states." ' In its close relation to an already existing moral
custom legal custom developed; and this legal custom soon
becomes strict law in that it turns into common law and stat-
utory law.2"' The ever changing legal ideals of different
times and places are nothing else than the various forms in
which the Idea of right, law, and justice progressively un-
folds itself in positive laws.20 1 Law and right must always
pursue a moral end.20 2 A right means "every officially recog-
nized claim to, or interest in, a good." 20' Law as such is
"the body of all individual rights and duties... which the
total moral will, the source of all true law, grants to or im-
poses upon itself and upon all subordinate individual wills
in order that we may pursue our moral ends and protect our
moral rights." 204
Htiffding calls -law "the sum total of certain manifest rules
for the application of coercion." 101 In its overall meaning
law signifies an attempt to guarantee a "moral minimum." 206
"The living legal genius of a people, its vital sense for what
is right and just,... is the last stronghold of every law, legal
order, and legal system." 207 Minsterberg defines law as
that "order in and through which the realization of the com-
mon will of all in their reciprocal relations with one another
is being guaranteed and secured in a purposeful manner
through the application of force." 208 Rickert calls legal
philosophy a "normative science," 209 while H. Cohen con-
siders law "the mathematics of the social sciences." 210
199 .thik, p. 215 (1886).
200 Ibid., P. 217.
201 Ibid., p. 567.
202 Ibid., p. 580.
208 Ibid., p. 575.
204 Ibid., p. 580.
205 Ethik, p. 533.
206 Ibid., p. 525. This notion was later ado
supr .
207 Ibid., p. 551.
208 Philosophic der Werte, p. 367 (1908).
209 Die Grenzen der naturwissenchajtlichen 1
ff. (1913).
210 Ethik des reinen Willens, p. 66 ff. (1904).
pted by Jellinek, see note 136,
3egriffsbildung, 2d edit., p. 508
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Ethics must realize itself in the law.21' Legal philosophy,
on the other hand, stands in need of ethics which is the real
foundation of all law and legal philosophy, 2 for law has its
roots in ethics."s The "law of laws" is the natural law which
signifies the ethical kernel of all law.214 Justice is the funda-
mental virtue of the law and the legal order.2"5
Schdffle defines law and custom as "orders and systems of
individual actions. Those orders are established by society;
they are adjusted to the historical conditions which form the
basis of social preservation; they are gained from experience
as to what is in the interest or runs contrary to the interests
of man; they are externally enforced by the force of the
popular legal genius; and they are strengthened by tradition
and long practice." 21 Post calls law "the realization of the
legal genius of whole interested groups.., in their historical
development," 21 while Vierkandt, -the sociologist, considers
law "a fixed relation of the power of action .... )) 218 Legal
relations are "restrictions of that basic urge or impulse
which is the source of arbitrary power." 21" Law is "the
emanation of an organized collective will which establishes
certain definite institutions or organs in order to bring about
the fullest realization of this organized collective will." 220
Matzat, who attempts to explain the origin and nature of
law on the basis of a socio-biological theory, calls law a
"process or relationship of assimilation (Anpassungsver-
lidltnis) of the many - the sum total of these processes of
assimilation." 22 It is, in other words, a "relationship. of
211 Ibid., p. 213.
212 Ibid, p. 214.
218 Ibid., p. 215.
214 Ibid.,p. 68, p. 70.
215 Ibid., p. 71.
216 Bau und Leben des sozialen Kirpers, vol. I, p. 334 ff. (1875-1878).
217 Einleitung in das Studium der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz, p. 9, p. 18 ff.
218 Gesellsclhaftslehre, p. 257 (1923).
219 Ibid., p. 257.
220 Ibid., p. 383.
221 Philosophie der Anpassung nit besonderer Bericksichstigung des Rechts
und des Staats, p. 149 (1903)
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mutual assimilation between two or more persons in which
-the external conduct of one person is being determined by
the will of another person, and... the external conduct of
this other person is being determined by the will of the first
person." 222 Woltmann, a social Darwinist, on the other
hand, defines law and the struggle for law and order as a
struggle for "the law of the stronger."2"' According to
Goldscheid, however, "law and right as found in the cultural
evolution of mankind is nothing else than a synthesis be-
tween natural law and historically evolved positive enact-
ments." 224 All positive law has to adjust itself to the Idea
of the cultural evolution of mankind. 25  The "epigenetic"
concept of law and justice is tantamount to the postulate
of self-preservation and individual self-unfolding.226 This
"epigenetic" concept of law and justice always inquires:
"What social achievement does any individual have to show
in order to be justified in considering himself evolutionally
superior to his fellow man." 227 Mezger calls "the preserva-
tion of social existence and the promotion of life in general
the supreme end of law." 228 "The preservation of social
existence and of life as the end of law is tantamount to a
perpetuation of the social struggle in a form which, however,
permits the survival of the contestants." 229 Hence law
means "the enforced removal of those extremist points of
view.., which would lead to a complete annihilation of the
opposing point of view." 20 "The creation of an appropriate
or fair competition among men . . . is the principle of just
law." 281 For such a fair competition constitutes "the source
222 Ibid., p. 169.
223 Politische Anthropologie, p. 154 ff. (1903).
224 Ent2 cklungswerttheorie, Entwicklungsikonomie, Menschentlkonomie, p.
163 (1908).
225 Ibid., p. 165.
226 Ibid., p. 166 ff.
227 Ibid., p. 167.
228 Sein und Sollen im Recht, p. 79 (1920).
229 Ibid., p. 102.
280 Ibid., p. 102.
281 Ibid., p. 103.
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of the welfare of the whole, that is to say, the preservation
of the greatest number of the strongest and most vital in-
dividuals." 22
Benedikt, who essays to explain the meaning of law on a
psychological basis, defines law as the very factor which
brings about a balance between pleasure and aversion."'
Stricker, on the other hand, calls law the product of man's
instinctive desire for power.2"" Hoppe insists that law is
something "which satisfies our spiritual emotions, something
which is being accepted by the rational process as aiming
at a praiseworthy end." 235 Beling, again, insists that law
"cannot be anything else than a fact of mass psychology"
(massenpsychologische Tatsdchlichkeit).236 It is the task
of legal science or legal philosophy "to determine the con-
cept of law and right; in addition it has to furnish the jurist
with a method by which the content of the law may be de-
fined; furthermore it has to examine the law as to its ideal
justification; and finally it must outline the ideal legal order
underlying all social existence." 237
The cultural aspects of law from a Neo-Kantian point of
view are emphasized by M. E. Mayer who insists that "law
in the wider sense of the term is the sum total of actions
undertaken by a politically organized society in order
to guarantee the promotion of certain common interests
through the establishment and application of a system of
norms." 238 "Law in the narrower sense of the term is the
232 Ibid., p. 104.
233 Zur Psychologie der Moral und des Rechts, p. 52 (1875).
234 Physiologie des Rechts, p. 3 (1884).
235 Der psychologische Ursprung des Rechts, p. 4 (1885). Similar ideas are
to be found in H. Maier, Die Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens (1908); Stark,
Die Analyse des Rechts (1916); Bozi, Im Kampf urn ein erfahrungswissenschaft-
liches Recht (1917); Kornfeld, Das Rechtsgefiihl (in: Zeitschrift jfir Rechtsphi-
losophie, vol. I); Riezler, Das Rechtsgefild (1921); Sturm, Die psychologischen
Grundlagen des Rechts (1910); Sturm, Die Form des Rechts (1911); Sturm, Die
Materie des Rechts (1911); Sturm, Recht und Vdlkerrecht (1918); Nelson, Die
Rechtsuiissenschaft ohne Recht (1917) ; Nelson, System der philosophischen Rechts-
lehre (1920); Haff, Rechtspsychologie (1924).
236 Rechtswissenschajt und Recht, p. 12 (1923).
237 Ibid., p. 44.
238 Rechtsphilosophie, p. 56 (1922).
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sum total of actions in which a politically organized society
engages in order to promote, through the application of com-
pulsion, certain common interests by the establishing and
applying of, a system of norms which in turn, are guaranteed
by the application of sanctions." 239 Radbruch defines law
as "a cultural phenomenon" and, as such, a historical fact re-
lated to a definite value or act of values. 4 Law is the work
of man, but its significance can only be understood with-
in the framework of an axiological method.241 Law, at the
same time, is more than a mere value; it is one of the real
forms in which a definite historical civilization becomes
manifest.242 Hence the concept of law and right is-a concept
pointing towards a definite reality; a concept, that is, the
real significance of which is to be found in the fact that it
is related to a definite value.24 Law, in the final analysis,
is that reality the last significance of which is to be found
in that it is subservient to the Idea of Justice. 44 The true
purpose of all legal philosophy consists in that it realizes
itself through the medium of interpretation and re-evalua-
tion of already existing social facts. 45 Legal philosophy is
primarily "legal axiology" (Recktswertbetyacktung) and
"legal teleology." As such it has one fundamental problem
- the end of law.24 "Norm, idea and life - legal phi-
losophy has a share in all of these three. It has for its sub-
ject-matter the command of the law-giver, a will, and thus
it is equally near to and far from the world that ought to
be and that of values, and the world of what is practicable
and what is." 247 Legal philosophy is "a cultural science"
(Kulturwissensckaft). "Law does not belong to the realm
of nature, nor to the realm of values, not to the realm of
239 Ibid., p. 56.
240 Rechtsphilosophie, p. 32, p. 29 (1932).
241 Ibid., p. 120, p. 32.
242 Ibid., p. 29.
243 Ibid., p. 32, p. 120.
244 Ibid., p. 29, p. 32.
245 Ibid., p. 33, p. 8, p. 119.
246 Grundzdge der Rechtsphilosophie, p. 28 ff. (1914).
24T Ibid., p. 211.
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faith; it belongs to the realm of human civilization. Hence
legal philosophy or legal science is a cultural science." 248
Lask calls legal philosophy "a. branch of the empirical cul-
tural sciences." 249 Law is "a real factor of all cultural
life." 250 "Not the laws, but law itself is the foremost sub-
ject of legal philosophy." 25'
Stamnmler considers the manifold interests in goods the
"material," and law and right the "formal" aspect of social
existence. Law is "an attempt at enforcing of what is be-
ing held to be right and just." 252 Law is, therefore, "the
.... compulsory rule of social co-existence," 25I the "neces-
sary prerequisite of a systematic and and orderly arrange-
ment of social life." 254 Order through law constitutes the
condition of all social existence.255 Just law (ricktiges
Recht) is "that law or norm which in a concrete situation
fully coincides with the fundamental idea of right and jus-
tice." 256 For its fullest unfolding and complete realization
law stands in need of ethics,257 and ethics again needs for
its realization in the existential world a "just law." 258 The
science of "just law" starts with the concept of what is ideal-
ly right and just; it criticizes all -laws and legal norms by
this fundamental concept; and strives for the unity and
harmony of all legal ideas. The basic idea of the "just
law" is "the unity and harmony of all individual ends in the
light of a single common purpose of society.259  The social
248 Ibid., p. 184. Similar ideas are to be found in Kohler (see note 170 ff.,
supra); Berolzheimer, System der Rechts-und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 5 vols. (1904
if); Eleutheropulos, Recht, Soziologie und Politik (1908); Spann, Der wahre
Staat (1921); Oppenheimer, System der Soziologie (1922); Vierkandt, Gesell-
schaftslehre (1923).
249 Rechtsphilosophie (in: Gesammelte Schriften, edit. Herrigel, 1923), p. 307.
250 Ibid., p. 313.
251 Ibid., p. 326.
252 Die Lehre yom richtigen Recht, p. 29 (1902).
258 Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung,
2d edit., p. 97 (1906).
254 Ibid., p. 96. Compare also Die Lehre vom richtigen Recht, p. 29.
255 Die Lehre vom richtigen Recht, p. 7.
256 Ibid., p. 15.
257 Ibid., p. 87.
258 Ibid., p. 90.
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ideal is "the community of free will individuals." 260 "The
appropriateness of a legally relevant content of the will is
nothing else than the harmony of this will with the social
ideal." 261 Theoretically "just law" is that law which is in
conformity with the universally valid end of social exist-
ence. 62 The fundamental principles of "just law" are four:
"(1) the content of a person's will must not be subject to
the arbitrary will of another; (2) a rightful demand can
only be maintained in such a manner and to such an exfent
that the person bound can still be his own neighbor (i.e., an
end in himself.)" 263 They are Stammler's "principles of
respect." 11 The "principles of participation" are: (3)
"No person legally bound is to be excluded from the com-
mon interest arbitrarily; (4) a legally conferred power of
disposition can only be exclusive so far as the person ex-
cluded may still be his own neighbor (i.e., an end in him-
self.)" The method most appropriate to legal philosophy
is the teleological method in collaboration with a logical or
critical method.- 6 Wielikowsky defines legal philosophy as
"the epistemology of law".., which "furnishes a consistent
system of the methodological prerequisites, the ever valid
and significant principles of legal reasoning in general." 2
But legal philosophy has a still more important task, namely
to be "a theory of legal values and legal evaluation." 268
Binder emphasizes that legal philosophy is a topic for the
philosopher -rather than the jurist. "The jurist attempting
to philosophize about the meaning of law and right must
... be aware of the fact that in doing so he is rather a phi-
losopher than a jurist." " Legal philosophy does not con-
260 Ibid., p. 198.
261 Ibid., p. 201.
262 Ibid., p. 185.
268 Ibid., p. 148.
264 Ibid., p. 148.
265 Ibid., p. 149.
266 Ibid., p. 13. Compare also, in general, Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft
(1911); Lehrbuck der Rechtsphlosophie (1922).
267 Die Neukantdaner in der Rechtsphlosoplde, p. 176 (1914).
208 Ibid., p. 178.
269 Pilosophie des Rechts, p. 2 (1925).
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cern itself with legal concepts, but rather with the Idea of
law and right; "It is not our (scil., the legal philosopher's)
task to ascertain and analyze . ..cases which are legally
relevant and to establish what ever element they may have
in common. For it is our task to establish their rationally
compelling nature, in other words, to uncover that one ele-
ment which cannot be disputed away without changing com-
pletely the object of our investigation." 270 "The province
of legal philosophy is not nature but civilization. The funda-
mental conception with which the legal philosopher must
operate is not causality, that which must be, but freedom,
that which ought to be. The rules with which legal phi-
losophy or the science of law has to do are not theoretical,
but practical; and the world which comes under its investi-
gation is that of Ideas." 271 All law "exists for the sake of
the Idea of law and right. But this Idea is not one and the
same with an "ideal law," with a system of isolated and
universally valid legal concepts .. .The Idea of law and
right has the meaning of a higher directive which cannot be
ignored whenever we are dealing with the empirical legal in-
stitutions of man." 272 Salomon calls legal philosophy "that
domain of general philosophy which is related to the empiri-
cal science of law." 278 Legal philosophy is the doctrine of
legal principles.274 At the same time it is the first chapter
of ethics. "Legal philosophy deals with those problems or
phenomena of law and right which constitute the 'apex' and
the core of all empirical legal sciences." 275
Minch, a disciple of the axiological School of Heidelberg
(Rickert, Windelband, Radbruch, Lask) defines law as "the
uniform order of social existence which is meant to be abso-
lutely valid and binding, and which, therefore, is being un-
derstood as something that can be enforced as well as some-
270 Ibid., p. 119.
271 Ibid., p. 852.
272 Ibid., p. 789.
273 Grundlegung zur Rechtsphilosophie, 2d edit., p. 103 (1922).
274 Ibid., p. 116.
275 Ibid., p. 198
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thing that ought to be observed." 276 Sauer insists that "the
legal order is always composed of rigid and immutable
norms. This order has its origin in a supreme power to
coerce." 277 The legal order, however, is "assisted by the
cultural order which has as its object the finer and better
things of life." 278 This cultural order can no longer be
"paragraphed by the law or turned into uniform rigid pat-
terns by the state." 279 Legal philosophy mediates between
positive legal science and social philosophy.28 ° "From posi-
tive legal science legal philosophy gains its materials, while
from social philosophy it derives its higher directives. Hence
legal philosophy is part and parcel both of a positive legal
science as well as social philosophy." 281
Some writers on legal philosophy attempt to apply Hus-
serl's "phenomenological approach" to jurisprudence. Thus
Reinach sees the main task of all legal philosophy in the dis-
covery of those truths a priori within the domain of law and
right which, like pure mathematics or logical axioms are
absolutely valid and, hence, precede all legal experience. By
"grasping the true essence of law (rechtlice Wesemschau)
we shall be able to discover within the law that which "is
absolutely and necessarily valid about the law." 282 True
legal concepts have their own ontological or existential mean-
ing 18' The positive law at times develops quite independ-
ently of these a prioli concepts in that it often ignores the
very essence and the principles which actually constitute
true law.284 Felix Kaufmann insists that "legal philosophy
is legal ontology (Wesenslehre vom Recht) . . . and as such
constitutes the necessary theoretical foundation for every
276 In: Zeitschrift fur Rechtsphiosophie, vol. I, p. 126. Compare also
Erlebnis und Gestaltung (1913); Kultur und Recht (1918).
277 Philosophie der Zukunft, p. 202 (1923).
278 Ibid., p. 203.
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280 Ibid., p. 396.
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282 Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bfirgerlichen Rechts, p. 5 (1913).
283 Ibid., p. 6.
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science of the positive law . . ,, 285 "The jurist is con-
cerned with the ever changing empirical contents of the
various legal norms, while the legal philosopher concentrates
on the a priori and stable forms of these legal norms." 286
All legal philosophy is, therefore, "essentially an a prioi
theory of rules of law" (Rechtssatz).28T The aim of all legal
philosophy is to establish a "system of a pure theory of
law." 288 Schreier claims that there are but four basic legal
concepts, namely a statement of fact, a person, a perform-
ance (or act), and a sanction. Hence the basic formula of
law and any legal norm is this: "Given a certain fact a per-
son has to act under the pressure of a sanction." 289
Kelsen insists that all legal philosophy is a "normative
science." "The normative character of legal philosophy be-
comes manifest in a negative way in that legal philosophy
has not to interpret actual events, that is to say, those events
which belong into the existential realm. Legal philosophy
is not an explicative science. The normative character of
legal philosophy becomes manifest in a positive manner in
that all legal philosophy has norms for its sole object
.. ,, 290 The "exclusively normative nature of legal phi-
losophy is based upon the particular character of the legal
norm (Rechtssatz) as contrasted by the moral norm (Sitten-
gesetz), in other words, upon the strictly heteronomous
character of the legal norm." 291 "Since the legal norm orig-
inates in complete independence of all actual conduct of
man, it is never an abstraction gained from experience
.... ,, "I Legal concepts are never teleological concepts.
"A teleological interpretation can never lead to the discovery
of legal concepts, but only to the establishment of sociologi-
285 Logik und Reohtswissenschaft, p. 43 (1922).
286 Ibid., p. 54.
287 Ibid., p. 54.
288 Ibid., p. 134.
289 Grundbegriffe und Grundformen des Rechts, p. 70 (1924).
290 Hauptprobleme der Staaasrechstslehre, p. 6 (1911).
291 Ibid., p. 43.
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cal, economic, or psychological concepts." "' "The elimina-
tion of the teleological element from the conceptual con-
struction of the law turns all legal concepts into purely for-
malistic categories." 1"4 Legal philosophy, as the "pure
science of law," is a "geometry of the whole of legal phe-
nomena." "5  A pure theory of law, being a science, "can-
not answer the question whether or not a law is just, be-
cause this question cannot be answered scientifically." 296
Law signifies "a specific technique of social organization." 297
"Only a positive legal order evinced by objectively deter-
minable acts - which is the positive law - can be the ob-
ject of a science . . . [and] the object of a pure theory of
law, which is a science, not metaphysics, of law." 298 "Law
is a coercive order ... ;" it is that "social technique which
consists in bringing about the desired social conduct of men
through the threat of a measure of coercion which is to be
applied in case of a contrary conduct." " Law is. "the or-
ganization of force." "I For the law "attaches certain con-
ditions for the use of force only by certain individuals and
only under certain circumstances." 801 In the rule of law
the employment of force is "a sanction, i.e., the reaction of
a legal community against a wrong." 302 "The norms which
form a legal order must be norms stipulating a . . . sanc-
tion." "I The general legal norms "must be norms in which
a certain sanction is. made dependent upon certain condi-
298 Ibid., p. 89. Compare also Die Grenzen der juristischen und der sozio-
logischen Methode (1911); Die Rechtswissenschaft als Norm-oder als Kultur-
wvissenschaft (in: Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 40, 1916).
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295 Ibid., p. 93.
296 A General Theory of Law and State (in: 20th Century Legal Philosophy
Series, vol. I, p. 6 (1945). This book contains a complete restatement of all
of Kelsen's views on law and legal philosophy. As for Kelsen's many writings,
ibid., p. 447-454.
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tions." "04 The concept of "the legal rule ... is the central
concept of jurisprudence." 30I "A legal rule (Recktssatz)
or rule of law ... is a hypothetical judgment attaching cer-
tain c6nsequences to certain conditions." 306 Legal means
that "the behavior of a person corresponds . . . to a legal
norm which is presupposed to be valid . . . because this
norm belongs to the positive legal order." 307 Illegal, on the
other hand, "means the very condition for ... a coercive act
or sanction." 308 A legal duty "is nothing else but the valid-
ity of a legal norm which makes a sanction dependent upon
the opposite of the behavior forming the legal duty. The
legal duty is simply the legal norm in its relation to the in-
dividual to whose behavior the sanction is attached in the
norm." 300 "There can be no legal rights before there is
law." 310 A right is "a legal norm in its relation to the in-
dividual who, in order that the sanction shall be executed,
must express a will to that effect." I" In other words, a
right is the setting into motion the consequences of a disre-
gard of a certain norm or rule of law by an "interested"
person.312 A right is, therefore, "the execution of a certain
sanction . . . initiated and carried out only in consequence
of a declaration of will to that effect by a particular individ-
ual - the plaintiff." I" All rights are relative rights.31
"The legal order is a system of norms." 31 A legal norm is
valid and compelling "by virtue of the fact that it has been
created according to a definite rule and by virtue there-
of." 318 Law is always positive law, and its positivity lies
304 Ibid., p. 45.
305 Ibid., p. 50.
306 Ibid., p. 45.
307 Ibid., p. 14.
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in the fact that it is created by the acts of human beings.
It is law because it is something that is valid because it has
been created as something meant to be valid. 1 ' "The basic
norm of a positive legal order is nothing else than the funda-
mental rule according to which the various norms of the
legal order are to be created." 318 And this basic norm - the
constitution - "is valid because it is presupposed to be
valid; and it is presupposed to be valid because without this
presupposition no human act could be interpreted as a legal
... act." 319
This survey of definitions should make it quite clear that
the majority of the ideas expressed by German legal phi-
losophers are under the influence of philosophical specula-
tion and not juristic consideration. The Germans, although
never lacking in profound scholarship, seem to revel in ab-
stractions which at times obscure rather than elucidate the
subject. In any event, they seem to bear out Binder's fa-
mous statement that "the jurist attempting to philosophize
about the meaning of law and right ... must be aware of
the fact that in doing so he is rather a philosopher than a
jurist."' 820
Anton-Her-mann Chroust.
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